I have posted the latest pages in my Iraq War Statistics spreadsheet and charts.
In doing my research, I found this interesting article from Salon…
What most Americans are probably unaware of, however, is just how many American soldiers have been deployed. Well over 1 million U.S. troops have fought in the wars since Sept. 11, 2001, according to Pentagon data released to Salon. As of Jan. 31, 2005, the exact figure was 1,048,884, approximately one-third the number of troops ever stationed in or around Vietnam during 15 years of that conflict.
More surprising is the number of troops who have gone to war since 9/11, come back home, and then were redeployed to the battle zone. Of all the troops ever sent to Iraq or Afghanistan, one-third have gone more than once, according to the Pentagon. In the regular Army, 63 percent of the soldiers have been to war at least one time, and almost 40 percent of those soldiers have gone back. The highest rate of first-time deployments belongs to the Marine Corps Reserve: Almost 90 percent have fought.
The particularly grinding service in Iraq puts a special brand of wear and tear on the troops, as evidenced in, among other things, the rate of mental illness among soldiers coming home. Among veterans who served in Iraq and are now seeking healthcare from the Department of Veterans Affairs, one in four is now being diagnosed with a mental problem, according to a recent study in the New England Journal of Medicine. There are no front lines in Iraq: Transportation companies, military police and civil affairs soldiers face the same risk of random ambush or death by roadside bombs. The stress goes on 24 hours a day for an entire tour. (Tours vary by unit, with some Army soldiers serving up to a year per tour, and Marines serving seven-month tours.) Veterans of Vietnam say some of that sounds eerily familiar.
[M]ilitary experts said the tempo of the Iraq war will eventually erode the Army and the Marine Corps into a state of disrepair similar to that after Vietnam, when discipline, morale and readiness were considered by some historians to be the worst ever.
“If you want to ask how to destroy the all-volunteer Army, the Bush administration has provided a textbook case,” Lawrence J. Korb told an audience at a Center for American Progress debate on the draft this month. Korb, an assistant secretary of defense under Reagan, said the strain may soon become overwhelming — and Bush is not doing enough about it. “It may be that at some point we have cracked the all-volunteer force so much, we will have to do something else.”
Then I also found another article explaining how, if we adjusted our combat fatalities to account for the new medical technologies that can save a mortally wounded serviceman who would have died of the same injuries back in Vietnam, then we experienced in Iraq 2004 the same level of combat deaths as Vietnam 1966:
After factoring in medical, doctrinal, and technological improvements, infantry duty in Iraq circa 2004 comes out just as intense as infantry duty in Vietnam circa 1966—and in some cases more lethal. Even discrete engagements, such as the battle of Hue City in 1968 and the battles for Fallujah in 2004, tell a similar tale: Today’s grunts are patrolling a battlefield every bit as deadly as the crucible their fathers faced in Southeast Asia.
Atul Gawande (a former Slate contributor) concluded that improvements to military medicine since Vietnam have dramatically reduced the rate at which U.S. troops die of wounds sustained in combat. The argument follows a 2002 study that tied improvements in U.S. civilian trauma medicine to the nation’s declining murder rate. While firearm assaults in the United States were rising, the murder rate was falling, largely because penetration wounds that proved fatal 30 years ago were now survivable. Thus, today’s murder rate was artificially depressed in comparison to the 1960s.
Gawande applied the same methodology to U.S. casualty statistics in previous wars, arriving at a “lethality of wounds” rate for each conflict. In World War II, 30 percent of wounds proved deadly. In Korea, Vietnam, and the first Gulf War, this rate hovered between 24 percent and 25 percent. But due to better medical technology, doctrinal changes that push surgical teams closer to the front lines, and individual armor protection for soldiers, this rate has dropped to 10 percent for Operation Iraqi Freedom for all wounds. For serious wounds that keep a soldier away from duty for more than 72 hours, the mortality rate is now 16 percent. Simply, a soldier was nearly 1.5 times more likely to die from his wounds in Vietnam than in Iraq today.
And even now, we hear the echoes of Vietnam, where the peace movement says “get the troops out now before more die needlessly” and the war movement that cries “the peaceniks are eroding our political will to fight; we need more troops in Iraq, not less!”
In Vietnam, it took us 13 years and 58,000+ lives to realize that you cannot outlast an insurgency in its own country. We’re almost 2½ years and 1,875 deaths into this quagmire. Have we learned nothing?
